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sending State subject to our recognition. Since they are citizens or permanent residents of this country their privileges and immunities are to a lesser
degree than accorded career consul officers.
I hope I have been able to convey a sense of the operations of the Office
of Protocol in the area of privileges and immunities. It is important work
requiring a knowledge of the governing treaties and domestic statutes.
Although our efforts in this area are by necessity usually discreet they
require expertise and tact, essential ingredients of successful diplomacy.
ABELARDO L. VALDEZ

Timberlane Three Steps Forward,
One Step Backwards
Introduction
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America I the Court held that the
traditional "effects" test 2 governing extraterritorial application of the
United States antitrust laws
[Ils alone not a sufficient basis on which to determine whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a matter of international comity and
fairness. In some cases, the application of the direct and substantial test in the
international context might open the door too widely by sanctioning jurisdiction
over an action when these considerations would support dismissal. At other
times, it may fail in the other direction, dismissing a case for which comity and
fairness do not require forebearance, thus closing the jurisdictional door too
tightly-for the Sherman Act'does reach some restraints which do not have a
direct and substantial effect on the foreign commerce of the United States. A
more comprehensive inquiry is required.

Such an inquiry by Judge Choy in Timberlane led to his proposal of a
three-part test:
Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the United States? Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act? As a matter of international comity and
fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to
cover it?4
-549 F.2d 597 (1976).
2
The "effects" test is the legacy of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Under this formulation, acts committed by
aliens outside the territorial boundaries of the United States are within the jurisdiction of
United States antitrust laws if these acts are intended to affect United States foreign commerce
and do so affect it. Id., at 444.
3549 F.2d at 613.
4

1d., at 615.
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In the consideration of the third question, Judge Choy recommends an ad
hoc "evaluation and balancing of the relevant considerations in each
case: ' '5 Such a "balancing" is to be performed over a series of concerns
amalgamated from earlier treatments in the Restatement (Second) ofForeign
Relations Law of the United States 6 and in Kingman Brewster's Antitrust
8
andAmerican Business Abroad. 7 In the language of Timberlane, these concerns
[lInclude the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Analysis of these competing interests and their ultimate resolution together
with the adaptation of a modified "effects" threshold in the first two parts of
the test is claimed by the Court to provide an interpretation of the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws which is in keeping with the spirit of the
legislation, recognizes the constraining influences of public international
law in general and United States foreign policy in particular, and brings a
greater realism and appropriateness to the adjudication of such disputes.
Concentrating on the "balancing" test, this discussion takes a contrary view.
It is here argued that such a radical modification of the "effects" test is not
needed; that the Timberlane "balancing" test is even in theory a cumbersome and inapposite approach to the perceived need; that in practice it has
been seen to be unworkable; and that its relation to the other two portions
of the overall test also reveals disabilitating drawbacks. A review of recent
commentaries on Timberlane brings to light similar misgivings. Judge
Choy's proposal at best represents a considerable muddying of the waters;
at worst, a source of almost indefinite delay and confusion to enforcement
without any of the countervailing attention to foreign relations sensitivities
which it purports to foster.
Need for a Balancing Test
The validity of an "effects" test to determine subject matter jurisdiction
has typically been criticized on two grounds: that its reach is insufficiently
discriminating (usually too broad) and that its applications ignores other
serious interests (usually public international law, sovereignty, and foreign
relations policy).
5

1d., at 613.

6RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

para. 40.
(1965),
7

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958), at 446.

'549 F.2d at 614.

Timberlane

421

A reasonably objective indication of the Sherman Act's foreign commerce ambit under an effects test might be found in the fact that from American Banana9 till the present (or at least 1973), no government foreign trade
claim has been rejected on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, '0
and private actions have been nearly as successful. This frequently cited' I
piece of legal folklore is also noted in Timberlane 12 without any further
discussion. Such a result may of course be attributed to a preponderance of
properly brought cases rather than an overly broad test.1 3 Government and
private claims have been rejected on other grounds to be sure, most notably
with respect to the Act of state doctrine,' 4 and it can be argued 15 that the
Timberlane balancing proposal largely confuses that defense with the jurisdictional limits it attempts to set up. Indeed, the view in Timberlane that,
perversely enough, the "effects" test will sometimes fail to reach violations 16 seems to be based on an impression that the Act of State doctrine is
applied too broadly instead.' 7 Even if this conclusion is true, the
Timberlane correction smacks too much of Ptolemaic epicycles. In any
event, jurisdiction has not been8 rejected by any court following -the
Timberlane balancing test either.'
Another more theoretical reason for not immediately finding the "effects"
test too broad is that even under the conflict of laws approach endorsed by
Timberlane' 9 it seems to be acceptable that the jurisdictional reach of a
theory should be commensurate with the strictness of the underlying legislated interests. Given the comparative stringency in the international community of American antitrust regulation and the body of law that has
grown around it, it is neither sinister nor slack-minded for jurisdiction to be
found fairly routinely. The inappropriate stance would instead be an
attempt at universal application of a law to which no national concern
attached.
In a more practical vein, the stake of the United States in the world econ'American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
"FuOATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS, (2d ed. 1973), at 498.
"Eg., Griffin, A Critique ofthe Justice Department'sAntitrust Guidefor International Operations, II COR. INT'L L.J. 205 (1978), at 227 without credit.
12549 F.2d at 608 n.12.
of the litigated cases have involved relatively obvi"As even Timberlane admits "...most
ous offenses and rather significant and apparent effects on competition within the United
States . . . It is probably in part because the standard has not often been put to a real test that
it seems so poorly defined." 549 F.2d at 611.
4
1' The Act of State Doctrine may be briefly stated as the principle that the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment upon the acts of a foreign sovereign performed within its own
territory. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
"Cf.notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
16549

F.2d at 613.

"Becker, Comment: Sherman Act Jurisdictionand the Acts ofForeign Sovereigns, 77 COL. L.
REV. 1247 (1977), at 1248.
"Cf. notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
"549 F.2d at 608-12.
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omy generally might also render the "effects" test's reach more palatable. 20
A large proportion of all international trade is carried on by American corporations; if anything, in the foreign trade arena the reach of personal jurisdiction is even longer than that of subject matter jurisdiction. The range of
the "effects" test only mirrors national economic activities and involvement.
With respect to conflicts in the international dimension, problems are
real, although more political than legal. In the realm of public international law, the "effects" test with its "direct and substantial" standard is
stricter than the minimum required out of deference, for "the practice of
states does not reflect any distinction among the types of effects involved"
in a determination of jurisdiction, i.e. any causal tie can serve as a basis.2 1
The balancing approach, apparently believing in an antitrust heaven, contends that the test's reach should exeed its grasp, if only to avoid "an open
invitation to outrage and retaliation, a progressive anarchy of legal conflict."' 2 2 (If such retaliation is in the form of foreign application of equally
strict antitrust laws, it is difficult to see what is to be feared. This point is at
the'heart of the reach-commensurate-with-strictness argument mentioned
above.)
Notwithstanding these points, considerable acrimony has arisen on several occasions, and one foreign commentator has hailed Timberlane's balancing approach as removing "an affront to international law occasioned by
the present exercise of American antitrust jurisdiction purely on the basis of
'effects' upon American commerce. '23 Of course, it can be presumed that a
balancing test is seen as a step in the right direction because jurisdiction will
occasionally not be exercised, but, as pointed out above, this has yet to
occur. One must accordingly ask whether it is effectively more insulting to
the sovereignty of a foreign country for its interests to be ignored under an
"effects" tests or to be directly considered and found inconsequential under
a "balancing" approach.
It is clear that some form of balancing has always informed enforcement
decisions, and the privacy and informality of those decisions may prevent a
direct insult occasioned by a court opinion. This is recognized even in the
Antitrust Guide to InternationalOperations, where the Department of Justice claims that its intent is to "avoid unnecessary interference with the sovereign interest of foreign nations."'24 The Antitrust Division head John
Shenefield went further in stating that "I fully recognize that unique factors
"°Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Violations-Paths Through the
Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, at 544-45; Becker, supra note 17 at 1247 n.2.
'RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, para. 18, Reporter's Notes at 55. Cf. Metzger, The Restatement ofthe Foreign Relations Law ofthe United States: Bases and Conflicts ofJurisdiction, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 7 (1966), at 15.
2"BREWSTER, supra note 7 at 298.
"'Taylor, The Extraterritoriality ofthe Australian Antitrust Law, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 273
(1978), at 300.
'Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidefor International
Operations (1977) at 7.
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are involved in the foreign commerce aspects of enforcement and I intend
to ensure that we give them adequate consideration. If we neglect to do so,
then it is clear to me that the courts, under Timberlane, should rein us in."'25
This reliance on Timberlane seems inappropriate as well as unnecessary. It
is clearly inappropriate as a call for the courts to second-guess not only the
foreign relations policy of the United States, as the balancing test would
typically have them do, but also the enforcement priorities of the Department of Justice. It is unnecessary to the extent that the courts have traditionally behaved in a fashion which will produce similar results, but which
is based (more wisely, it will be argued below) on the Act of State doctrine
and related defenses rather than direct contemplation of foreign affairs. 26
Where more sweeping language exists, it typically still embraces the
"effects" test, as in Judge Hand's statement in Alcoa, 27 cited in
Timberlane:28
It is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as those in this Act,
without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exer-

cise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the
"Conflict of Laws." We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all
whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the

United States.

That is, the "effects" test itself is seen as the moderating influence on jurisdiction with a respectful nod to international law. Following Alcoa in seeing the effects test as a restraint on jurisdiction rather than an unleashing of
it is Pacific Seafarers,Inc. v. Pacific FarEast Line, Inc.,29 where in a similar
context the Court states that it "may fairly be inferred, in the absence of a
clear showing to the contrary, that Congress did not intend an application
'30
that would violate principles of international law."
Another harm that a more explicit balancing arrangement might bring
about would be an increased public perception (probably accurate) of being
at the mercy of foreign relations policy without protection of the laws. If it
is assumed arguendo that an "effects" test has been met in a given test but
the claim founders on the "balancing" test, it must be concluded that American citizens have suffered injury, in all likelihood greater than that complained of by the plaintiff, but that harm is being deliberately ignored.
Admitted insults to a nation's own populace should take precedence over
hypothetical ones to the international community. (This withdrawal may
also have adverse constitutional effects.)
2

Shenefield, The Perspective ofthe U.S. Department oJustice, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS

(Griffin, ed. 1979),

at 24.
"Cf.notes 58-87 and accompanying text.
27148 F.2d at 443.
2S549 F.2d at 613, in abbreviated form.

29404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969). Cf.also Note, American
Antitrust LiabilityofForeign State Instrumentalities:A New Application ofthe ParkerDoctrine,
II COR. INT'L L.J. 305 (1978), at 315-16.
30

1d. at 814.
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A consequence of this particular "balancing" test of Timberlane is that,
carried to its logical extreme, it might be antithetical to the international
comity it claims to protect. Under the Timberlane criteria, jurisdiction
would be most likely to be asserted where no foreign policy crisis exists,
both nations have similar attitudes towards similar laws, and no enforcement problems present themselves. In other words, jurisdiction would be
exercised in precisely those cases where there is no need for doing so in
order to eliminate the harm, and where such exercise may seem the most
arbitrary and detrimental to continued good relations. Conversely, jurisdiction would not be exercised in exactly those circumstances where the
United States does have a stake in a differing result. Part of this failing is
31
due to Judge Choy's omission of highly relevant Restatement language,
quoted early in the opinion 32 but significantly omitted in the presentation
of and reference to his criteria: 33 the Restatement's list is only applicable
where two nations requireinconsistent behavior on the part of the defendant. There, upon appropriate "balancing," the Restatement proposes that
jurisdiction can still be exercised. (The courts typically are much more conservative, following the sovereign compulsion defense.) Many of
Timberlane's problems come from the application of the list to consistent
behavior, including the absurdity sketched above. The more accepted
34
approach is to reject jurisdiction where laws are similar.
Several alternatives to an explicit balancing test have been proposed
without a great deal of plausibility to recommend them. Rahl has suggested submission of such cases to the International Court of Justice. 35 The
political sensitivities of such a move, not to mention the practical workload
constraints, would dwarf any seen in the current debate. One commentator
finds the problems of implementing a "balancing" test to be due to the inexperience of judges in international matters and the narrow precedential
base. His remedy would be the creation of a special Extraterritorial Court
which would deal exclusively in such cases. 36 Such an answer sidesteps the
more basic question as to whether courts should be performing this function
37
at all, especially if it is admitted that they cannot do so at the present.
One approach with a kernel of reasonability would be the abolition of private suits in the foreign trade area. 38 The inference is that the appropriate
foreign policy balancing would be done by enforcement authorities rather
3

'RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, para. 40: "Where two states have jurisdiction ...
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct."

and the

32549 F.2d at 613.

at 614 n.31.
'Rosenfield, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: .4 Conflict of Laws
Approach,
28 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (1976), at 1034.
5
13Id.,

3

3 RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST (1970), at 411-13.
36

Patterson, Act of State Doctrine-Limitationon Application ofthe Act of State Doctrinein
ExtraterritorialPrivateAntitrust Suits, 10 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 475 (1977), at 484.
37jd.

3

Id., also, Jones, Extraterritorialiyin United States Antitrust,- An International "Hot

Potato," II INT'L LAW. 415 (1977), at 435.
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than uninformed private parties, or, presumably, the courts. The United
States is a maverick in allowing them, and their disappearance would not
be mourned greatly on the international scene. Domestic political reaction
to such a move, however, would be negative; lost as well would be the
"watchdog" function such private suits perform and the public sense of
involvement in and protection by the antitrust laws mentioned above.
Finally, perhaps the greatest difficulty in the radical imposition of a "balancing" test as proposed in Timberlane is the discontinuity introduced, not
just in the traditional precedent but in the decision-making process of any
given case. In "obvious" cases, a "balancing" test is neither needed nor
relevant. Indeed, the novelty of the Timberlane proposal is sometimes
defended by pointing out that jurisdictional decisions have typically not
been difficult ones. 39 But just in those potential cases where the decision
becomes close, where the claim is operating in the outer penumbra of the
"effects" test, then suddenly a new test is imposed, the criteria for which
have nothing to do with facts or theories under consideration up to that
time. The "balancing" test balances more than just international interests,
problematical as they are. It must also balance those interests with the
strength of the antitrust claim, an even more strained apples-and-oranges
problem. At a determination's most tenuous and confused point, the "balancing" test introduces a new order of complexity just when it can be handled least well. (One possible compromise which would interrupt the
process less severely would be the use of economic criteria for the balancing, i.e., criteria much more accessible by the courts such as the effect in the
United States economy, similar economic interests, protection of the business community, consideration of vested rights, etc.) 40
Feasibility of the Timberlane "Balancing" Test
The feasibility of the successful application of the Timberlane balancing
test may be attacked on at least three grounds: the text calls for resolution
of issues beyond the competence of the courts; it fails to clarify relevant
issues and in fact further confuses them; and it fails to adequately distinguish itself from other defenses and abstention doctrines.
The competence of the courts is strained by the Timberlane approach in
terms of both the political questions involved and the inherent complexity
and subjective evaluation of the interests to be balanced. With respect to
the former, the courts must first question the wisdom of a suit being brought
in the first place (a task perhaps usefully but not comfortably to be performed in any private action but one certain to provoke confrontation in a
government case) and then analyze the claim in the light of presumed
understanding of United States foreign policy, present and future, not to
mention the relevant foreign interests and the policies informing those
39549 F.2d at 611, citing AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (1974), at 129 n.455.

'"Fortenberry, supra note 20 at 521, 544-45.
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interests. Such judgments at best may represent second-guessing a good
portion of the Executive branch; in more extreme cases, these political questions may rise to the level of a "political questions" and constitute unacceptable interference with the Executive branch's exclusive foreign relations
power. In the past such deference has taken place in response to an actively
expressed State Department opinion or even new legislation.4 1 Here the
courts are asked to sit in judgment on their own competence when it would
seem that they should not be able to get as far as "balancing" United States
foreign policy; the moment they foresee a substantial impact on such policy
is the time for abstention (which is not to say that the courts must be slavishly guided by expressions of foreign policy but simply that they may not
presumptively rule on its validity). A remark by Assistant Attorney
Shenefield 42 to the effect that under the 7mberlane test the courts are not
balancing the interests of the United States against those of other countries
but rather are balancing the interests of the United States prosecutions
against the potential damage to United States foreign relations seem ingenuous at best and hardly escapes the above problems.
That the elements of the Timberlane balancing test are inherently complex and call for an analysis which cannot hope to match even the superficial rigor given the economic issues seems obvious. Some commentators
(and presumably Judge Choy) are unperturbed, however. An Australian
reviewer of Timberiane concludes:
As to competency, although no proof is offered, for none is available, it is suggested that the Courts are at43least as able as any other body to evaluate and
balance the factors involved.
Though speaking more generally prior to Timberlane, another writer" is
equally sanguine in claiming the observation that "'the courts are not
equipped' applies to most judge-made rules of law." Neither statement
adds much insight into application of the balancing test, and even if completely accurate do not justify the creation of yet another set of arcane formulas. The more typical and accurate reaction is that Timberlane "falls
short of offering constructive guidelines" leaving readers "still mystified as
to how American courts can solve such problems" particularly in the
absence of even an implicit weighing scheme. 4 5 An earlier review of the
conflict-of-laws approach concluded that the Restatement test on which
Timberlane is based is far too ambitious and allowing of too many permutations; no effective "law" could develop in this area. 46 The most heartfelt
47
cries, however, come from Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
4'Becker, supra note 17,
"Shenefield, supra note
"'Taylor, supra note 23,
"Baxter, Choice ofLaw

at 1252-53.
25, at 23.
at 304.

and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 17 (1963), at 21.
4Note, The Act o/State Doctrine and Jursdictionover ExtraterritorialAntitrustViolations, 9
LAW. AMER. 709 (1977), at 725-26.
'Metzger, supra note 21 at 20.

"595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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where the Court was faced with the prospect of performing Timberlane's
balancing test for twenty-six foreign defendants. The Court found no
opportunity for any reasoned decision, and was appalled by the prospect of
48
The
exercising jurisdiction piecemeal over portions of the claim.
record.
for
the
performed
to
be
Timberlane test remains
With respect to clarity, it is clear at least that Timberlane represents a
considerable step backwards in the understanding and predictability of
jurisdictional determinations. Aside from the initial confusion due to the
adoption of any new process, the balancing approach brings problems of its
own in the move to radically new subject matter and incommensurability of
issues. A conflict-of-laws approach should ideally provide for the protection of justified expectations, certainty and uniformity of results, ease in
determining the law, and full disclosure of reasoning for the sake of fairness.4 9 The hodgepodge, ad hoc Timberlane list will do little to advance
these aims. Further, should other nations adopt the same approach, such a
balancing test could easily degenerate into a Chinese-boxes examination of
endlessly regressing interests and motivations.
Finally, the Timberlane test seems to provide more heat than light in its
failure to adequately distinguish itself from other defenses and abstention
doctrines. It is not obvious even from Judge Choy's opinion whether it is
properly part of a jurisdictional determination or whether it is a subsequent
decision not to exercise jurisdiction. For example, the second, sixth, and
seventh elements of the Timberlane test (nationality, intent, location of con50
duct) all duplicate elements of Sherman Act jurisdiction proper. Judge
Choy himself suggests in a later opinion that the Timberlane rules might be
appropriate for a ruling on a forum non conveniens issue.5 1 Such a usage
would avoid the invention of such an unwieldy tool for a new theory.
Judge Adams' concurring opinion in ManningtonMills 52 treats the "balancing" test not as a form of abstention (where he sees constitutional problems
lurking) but as an expansion of the jurisdictional test only. All in all, he
sees the balancing approach as more relevant to an examination of the foreign compulsion issues, 53 which is much closer to the original spirit of the
Restatement factors behind Timberlane.54 Other writers5 5 argue that the
Timberlane test merely lays the groundwork for consideration of the Act of
56
State doctrine, which Timberlane and Hunt v. Mobil Oil have broadened
somewhat by limitation of the inquiry into the motivation of a foreign sov"'Id., at 1298.
"'Rosenfield, supra note 34, at 1025, 1028-29.
'Cf. Fry, Recent Developments.- Antitrust-Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the Effects Doctrine-A Conflicts Approach, 46 FoRD. L. REV. 354 (1977), at 365.

"Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977) at 431.
52595 F.2d at 1302.

3d.
"RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, para. 40.
"Becker, supra note 17, at 1251-59; see generally Annotation, Extraterritoriality ofFederal
Antitrust Laws to Acts Occurring in Foreign Commerce, 40 A.L.R. FED. 343.
"6550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
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ereign. Still others claim that Timberlane is just a57common sense recognition of enforcement and compliance possibilities.
There seem to be no shortage of alternative theories and methodologies,
all with a stronger conceptual and precedential base, to accomplish what
Timberlane aspires to in its "balancing" test. Such experimental ventures
should not be allowed to dominate the development of the law in this
already crowded area.
The Timlerlane Test in Practice
The Timberlane test has not fared particularly well in its applications.
First, there has been some legitimate carping from the sidelines 58 that
Timberlane merely constructs a recital of elements traditionally examined
in foreign trade cases-similar conclusions of foreign law, 59 consistency
with United States foreign policy, 60 and the consequences of foreign nonrecognition of the American decision 6 -and that no new construction was
62
needed.
It also seems to be true that the "balancing" test as presented was not
actually required in Timberlane itself.6 3 The Court found no genuine conflict with the Honduran government in the first part of its decision exploring
the Act of State doctrine.64 Such "balancing" as was required was already
performed by the time the jurisdictional discussion was reached. That it
took place at all is probably due to Judge Choy's misleading application of
his criteria to instances where no inconsistent conduct is required by the
defendants.
Timberlane has not had a very loyal or enthusiastic following in other
courts as well. In Hunt v. Mobil Oil,65 an Act of State case where
Timberlane "balancing" and "piercing the sovereign veil" might seem
appropriate and useful, there is only a sidelong reference 66 in closing to
6
Timberlane67 citing Sabbatino. 8
In United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp .,69 the Court similarly
ignores in a patent licensing claim the "balancing" portion of Timberlane's
"Metzger, supra note 21, at 20; Patterson, supra note 36, at 481.
"Patterson, supra note 36, at 481.
"Haight, International Law and the Extraterritorial Applicability afAntitrust Laws, 63 YALE.
L.J. 643 (1954).

6
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); United
70,6000
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1963 Trade Cas.
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), ord modi. 1965 Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
6United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
2
Patterson, supra note 36, at 484.
"Note, International Law-Antitrust Law-Immunity to ExtraterritorialApplication of United
States Antitrust Law, 12 J. INT'L LAW & ECON. 487 (1978) at 494.
"549 F.2d at 605-08.
550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
6Id., at 78, n.14.
67Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 14.
6549 F.2d at 605.
6417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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jurisdictional determination, while still relying on the second part of the
70
test, the de minimis rule.
In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,7 1 a suit revolving around

patents obtained by fraud abroad, the Court found itself "in substantial
agreement with" the balancing approach of Timberlane,72 even expanding
Timberlane's list of seven factors to ten. 73 Mannington Mills' additional
criteria-pending litigation, existence of an antitrust treaty, and requirement of inconsistent behavior-are instructively more traditional and useful tests of jurisdictional reach than those of Timberlane and in fact require
very little "balancing" at all.
The Court found, however, that "The record in this case is not adequate
to allow a reasoned decision on these highly complex issues even if only one
foreign nation were involved rather than 26." 74 The Court went on to point
out that it was exceedingly unlikely for the resolution of such balancing to
lead to the same result in every instance, and that plaintiffs hope of a unitary action is a forlorn one. 75 The case was remanded to the District Court
for further consideration.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Adams expressed strong reservations on
the place of the "balancing" test as a mode of abstention, and believed that
it could only be appropriately used as a direct expansion of the jurisdictional determination itself.76 He also rightly observed that, following the

thrust of the original Restatement proposal, the test should only be applied
where foreign compulsion of inconsistent behavior exists. 77 Accordingly he
found jurisdiction easily without the need for balancing in Mannington
Mills and forestalled consideration of international repercussions to the
78
remedy stage.
In DominicusAmericana Bohio v. 6ulf& Western, 79 both Timberlane and

Mannington Mills were cited for support of a balancing approach, although
the Court found the Mannington Mills argument over abstention to be
inconsequential. 8" That said, the Court again concluded that "the record in
the case at bar is insufficient for a thorough review of all the relevant factors" 8 1 and further discovery was called for. In closing, the Court held that

"defendants must bear the burden of demonstrating that foreign policy considerations outweigh the need to enforce the antitrust laws where the for10549 F.2d at 613, 615.

7595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
72d., at 1297.
"Id., at 1297-98.
4Id., at 1298.
75Id.

'61d., at 1302.
771d.

71d.,
7473
'O1d.,
"Id.,

at
F.
at
at

1303.
Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
687-88.
688.
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eign commerce of the United States is affected,"' 82 in which case the
balancing test again seems closer to a foreign compulsion defense than a
mode of abstention.
Finally, in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells FargoExp. Co.,83 a claim involving extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, Judge Choy took an
opportunity to chide a lower court for not having had Timberlane before it
and for its subsequent inevitable misreading of the law.8 4 The Timberlane
balancing criteria were recited without any commentary and the case was
remanded with the burden on the plaintiffs to show a basis for jurisdiction.8 5 Also of note is that Judge Choy rejected the lower court's contention
that inconsistent foreign law undermines jurisdictional reach; 86 he did so,
however, without mentioning the full Restatement proposal with which he
is now in accord. Lastly, he surprisingly compared the considerations
of Timberlane's "balancing" test to a basis for a forum non conveniens dis87

missal.
The delay and confusion in these decisions brought about by Timberlane,
together with the failure to find any consistent manner of interpreting, let
alone implementing, the "balancing" test, represent a serious step backwards for conscientious determination of jurisdiction.
Relationship to the Tripartite Test
It is hoped that the discussion thus far has adequately demonstrated the
inutility of Timberlane's "balancing" test in its own right. Seen as the third
element of Judge Choy's tripartite test, which has not been adopted in any
case citing Timberlane, it is confronted with an additional problem.
The cases and commentators are virtually unanimous in declaring that
the order of the tests is inappropriate or even violative of constitutional
restraints.88 Judge Choy in Timberlane speaks of whether jurisdiction
should be asserted after finding grounds for jurisdiction in the first two
parts of the test.8 9 It seems mandatory that this discretionary decision be

omitted altogether, or at the very least exercised before finding jurisdiction.
Judge Adams, concurring Mannington Mills90 commented:

As I understand it, however, a court may not abstain where jurisdiction properly
lies unless abstention is warranted under a recognized abstention doctrine. See,
e.g., McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281, 30 S. Ct. 501, 54 L. Ed. 762 (1910);

821d.
"3556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
"Id., at 427.

"Id., at 429.
6Id., at 428-29.

"Id., at 431.
"Taylor, supra note 23, at 299-301; Mannington Mills, supra note 71, at 1301; Backer, supra
note 17, at 64 n.80; Ongman, Be No Longer a Chaos:. Constructinga Normative Theory of the

Sherman Act's ExtraterritorialJurisdictionalScope, 71 Nw. U.L.
9549 F.2d at 613.
90595 F.2d at 1301.

REV.

733 (1977), at 742-43.
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Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5. L. Ed. 257 (1821) ("It is most
true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true
that it must take jurisdiction, if it should. . , We have no more right to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.")
(ellipsis in original)
International comity does not present such a basis for abstention.
(In passing it should also be noted that the second portion of Judge
Choy's proposal---the de ninimis "cognizable injury" test 9 1-has also been
subject to considerable criticism for attempting to prejudge the merits of the
case.

92

Conclusion
The need for a "balancing" test as expressed in Timberlane is considerably overstated, for the range of the "effects" test is neither insufficiently
discriminating 93 nor violative of international law.94 Timberlane's "balancing" test as a remedy would have sharply counter-productive consequences. 95 The Timberlane test also interposes a radical discontinuity in
the decision-making process.
The "balancing" test raises issues which are too complex or equivocal for
97
judicial competence, 96 do not clarify the jurisdictional determination, and
98
It
are too easily confused with other defenses and abstention doctrines.
99
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A return to the "effects" test of Alcoa would be an advance.
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